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5ABSTRACT
This paper presents the results of an investigation of manufacturing firm strategies and
changes in these strategies as a result of trade liberalization, globalization and
transformations in the economic environment in which companies operate. The research
concluded that these changes have brought about substantial changes in firms’
behaviour. However, in spite of the importance of the influence of the economic
environment on firms, the research also led to the conclusion that there is a margin for
company strategy.
Innovative firms have adopted flexible behaviour and are upgrading their
production and marketing capabilities. They have introduced significant changes in
vertical integration, input procurement, technological innovations, incentive pay systems
and management techniques, training and subcontracting distribution and retailing.
The transformation that has taken place at the core of the manufacturing
business was one of the most interesting findings of the research. At least for the most
innovative consumer-goods manufacturing firms, this core has shifted from being mainly
concerned with production to combining manufacturing goods with distributing these
goods, and often other domestic and imported goods as well, thereby providing such
firms with a greater chance of simultaneously increasing their profits and defending their
market share.
Finally, the investigation also showed that uncertainty surrounding economic
policy leads to a substantial decrease in investment by firms. Such uncertainty explains
why more firms do not change, or why they often do not change faster. Uncertainty
about what they should do, as well as in respect to the sustainability of the economic
policy has a twofold negative effect on entrepreneurs’ decisions to transform their firms.
This suggests that there is a role for policy in terms of programmes that seek to
encourage firms to upgrade. At the same time, it must be stressed that the most
important role for policy is that of creating a stable economic environment in which
firms can plan long-term investment.
7RESUMEN
En el presente documento se dan a conocer los resultados de una investigación sobre las
estrategias aplicadas por empresas manufactureras y los cambios que han sufrido a
consecuencia de la liberalización del comercio, la globalización y la transformación del
entorno económico en el que operan las empresas. En la investigación se concluyó que
esos cambios habían modificado sustancialmente el comportamiento de las empresas
que, si bien se ven muy influenciadas por las condiciones económicas, también tienen
cierto margen de libertad para determinar las estrategias que aplicarán.
Las empresas innovadoras han adoptado una actitud de flexibilidad, y están
ampliando su capacidad productiva y de comercialización. Asimismo, han introducido
importantes cambios en la integración vertical, la adquisición de insumos, la adopción de
innovaciones tecnológicas, los sistemas de incentivos salariales y las técnicas de
gestión, la capacitación y subcontratación, la distribución y las ventas al por menor.
Una de las conclusiones más interesantes de la investigación es la referida a la
transformación que se ha producido en lo que respecta la tipo de actividades que
realizan las empresas manufactureras. Al menos en el caso de las industrias productoras
de bienes de consumo más innovadoras, el predominio de las actividades productivas ha
sido sustituido por una combinación de manufactura y distribución de productos de
fabricación propia, y en muchos casos también de distribución de otros productos
nacionales e importados, lo que ofrece a las empresas mejores posibilidades de
incrementar sus ganancias y proteger su participación en el mercado.
Por último, la investigación también demuestra que la incertidumbre con
respecto a la política económica redunda en una marcada disminución de las inversiones
de las empresas. Esa incertidumbre explica el hecho de que no haya más empresas
dispuestas a introducir cambios o a hacerlo más rápidamente. La incertidumbre con
respecto a lo que deben hacer y a la sustentabilidad de la política económica tiene dos
efectos negativos en lo que respecta a la decisión de los empresarios de introducir
modificaciones en sus firmas.
Esto indica que las políticas pueden cumplir una función en este ámbito, en lo
que respecta a la formulación de programas que alienten el perfeccionamiento
empresarial. A la vez, cabe señalar que la función más importante de las políticas es la
creación de un entorno económico estable en el que las empresas puedan planificar
inversiones a largo plazo.
9INTRODUCTION1
The countries of Latin America have undergone important transformations in the past
few years. There have been radical changes in macroeconomic and trade policies and in
the general economic environment, such as in matters relating to state intervention and
the regulatory framework. These changes have been accompanied by increased
globalization of world markets. As a result, there have been important changes at the
macroeconomic level and in the way the economies of the region relate to the world
economy. There have also been significant transformations in the behaviour of firms.
While there have been many studies on the macroeconomic changes that have
taken place in Latin America, studies on the microeconomic changes are relatively
scarce. One of the first of these studies examined how Chilean firms adapted to such
changes during the 1970s and early 1980s (Corbo and Sánchez, 1984). In recent years,
along with a consensus in most countries on what macroeconomic policies should be
adopted to achieve long-term stability, there has been a growing interest in doing
research on changes in manufacturing companies’ behaviour and the way they are
adapting to the new economic environment.2
This paper presents the results of an investigation into manufacturing firm
strategies and changes in these strategies as a result of trade liberalization, globalization
and transformations in the economic environment companies are operating in. The main
questions this research set out to answer were the following. Are Latin American firms
in traditional consumer-goods manufacturing sectors changing their strategies or are
they for the most part functioning as they did 20 years ago? How determinant is the
influence of macroeconomic events on microeconomic ones and what is the margin that
companies have for individual behaviour? If traditional consumer-goods manufacturing
firms’ behaviour is changing, what are the most important areas in which these changes
are taking place? What are the strategies of the firms in these industries that are most
advanced in the modernizing process in the region?
This investigation was carried out in medium-sized and large traditional
consumer-goods manufacturing firms in Chile, Mexico and Venezuela. From the onset, it
was decided to focus mainly on traditional consumer-goods manufacturing firms, since it
was assumed that they were among the most representative of the medium-sized and
large manufacturing firms that could  be found in all three countries. The sectors
included covered a wide range of industries, but strongly emphasized garment firms, as
a way of comparing the behaviour of firms across countries in comparable industries.
Garment firms were chosen because they belong to an industry that was established
several decades ago, not only in the countries included in the research, but in most
other Latin American countries as well. It was also interesting to study this industry
                                           
1 The author wishes to thank Ricardo Bielschowsky, Jorge Katz and Joseph Ramos for
many valuable comments that led to this paper.
2 Baumann, 1994; Bielschowsky, 1994; Castillo, Dini and Maggi, 1994; Katz, 1997.
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because it has been strongly exposed to import competition. The impact of globalization
on the garment sector world-wide also contributed to making it an interesting sector to
study.
Over 40 garment firms were included, in the study, although comparable data
were only available for 38 of them.3 Hence, the conclusions presented in this article are
inferred mainly from garment firms.4 Interviews with firm executives through
open-ended questionnaires were complemented with plant visits, as well as with
meetings with trade-association representatives, industry experts and government
officials. Firms were chosen so as to have a diversity of companies, but they do not
make up a representative sample. Most of the interviews took place in 1993, but some
were conducted in 1994 and 1995. In some cases, initial interviews were supplemented
by follow-up visits, so as to obtain a better perspective of changes in company strategy
over time. The investigation was carried out within the framework of the ECLAC/UNDP
Project on Innovation and Competitiveness.5
This paper is structured in the following way: the first section describes the
main characteristics of the behaviour of a traditional consumer-goods manufacturing firm
under import substitution. This section is partly based on the same interviews, with firm
executives, who  were questioned about the history of their firm. The second section
presents the main findings of the research concerning the behaviour of a traditional
consumer-goods manufacturing firm that is in the process of modernizing. The last
section presents the main conclusions.
Finally, a warning: while there are many different definitions of and indicators
used to measure competitiveness, in this paper the term “competitive” is used as a
synonym of “modernizer”: when a firm is described as being competitive, this should be
understood as meaning that it is an innovative firm, that is one that is striving for
survival and change, trying to find the most appropriate ways to adapt to a new
environment and, as a result, gaining a relative market share.
1. Company behaviour under import substitution
What are the main strategies of a firm manufacturing  consumer goods under import
substitution? This section tries to answer this question by describing the main features
of the evolution of a representative firm.
The typical firm interviewed in this survey is a family company that was initially
set up in a small workshop in sectors such as the garment or shoe sectors, or in a small
metal-casting plant. This small workshop slowly expanded, buying new equipment,
moving to new premises and becoming a manufacturing firm.
The transition from small workshop to manufacturing plant was often quite
difficult and risky, in the face of competition from many other similar workshops.
Financial assistance for small firms was generally unavailable, so that one of the critical
                                           
3 See appendix.
4 However, they appear to be valid for other traditional consumer-goods manufacturing
firms, such as those of the footwear and leather industries (Carla Macario, “Economies of scale
and learning while exporting in firms exporting non-traditional goods in Chile, Colombia and
Mexico”, ECLAC, forthcoming (1998).
5 ECLAC/UNDP RLA/88/039 Project on Innovation and Competitiveness. The interviews
were carried out by ECLAC staff members Mr. Wilson Peres, Ms. Martine Guerguil and the
author.
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factors in the transition was the ability to accumulate enough financial resources to
expand. Hence, very few workshops were able to be become manufacturing firms
unless the entrepreneurs were successful in obtaining sufficient funds, often thanks to
family support or to sheer luck.
Production was generally initially organized along the same lines as in the
workshop and slowly evolved into a pattern broadly based on the organization of work
in plants in developing countries.
Plant lay-out was often designed by the entrepreneur himself. The firm
manufactured a wide variety of products with unsophisticated design and quality
standards. This was appropriate for a growing body of consumers who were just
beginning to have access to manufactured goods and were therefore not very
demanding.
Management was generally the responsibility of family members and did not
follow professional criteria. Production workers were paid fixed wages or, in some
cases, on a piece-work basis, without strict quality requirements. Firms did not provide
training.
Most production operations were carried out internally by the firm.
Subcontracting was very rare and only used for very specific operations that it was
difficult to carry out in the plant itself, or to satisfy unexpected surges in demand.
In general, inputs were manufactured domestically, given import-substitution
policies, as well as the costs and delays involved in importing them from abroad. Larger
firms tended to be vertically integrated, manufacturing inputs for their own use, as well
as to sell to other domestic firms. There was a powerful incentive for firms to become
as integrated as possible since companies selling intermediate goods were often rivals in
the finished product market.
Most goods produced were sold on the domestic market. It was generally
difficult for consumer-goods manufacturers to export on a regular basis owing to a
combination of factors, such as the anti-export bias resulting from high tariffs or from
non-tariff barriers; the relatively low level of the exchange rate in most countries
throughout nearly all of the import-substitution period; and the very high, transportation
costs within the region.
Tariff and non-tariff barriers in other Latin American countries, which would
have been among the most attractive markets, also contributed to making exporting less
appealing. Protectionism and transport costs made it difficult to export to the
industrialized countries.
For the most part, firms tended to export occasionally to neighbouring countries,
particularly those with a lower degree of industrial development. Exports were
countercyclical, increasing when there was a drop in domestic demand or a depreciation
of the exchange rate. The products that were exported were the same ones that the
firms sold on the domestic market. Incentives were set up in such a way that most
consumer-goods firms specialized in manufacturing for the domestic market, protected
from external competitive pressures.
By the time they had been able to overcome the initial financial constraints and
had reached a certain production threshold, companies generally had relatively easy
access to financial support from the Government, provided credit at low and often
subsidized interest rates. This allowed the companies to continue expanding. Once
companies reached this stage, the pressures to increase productivity were not as strong
as when the financing was private.
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In addition, by the time the firm had established a manufacturing plant of an
adequate scale for the dimensions of the domestic market, competitive pressures from
similar domestic companies were considerably reduced. The small dimensions of the
domestic market often allowed it to be controlled by a limited number of firms that
engaged in collaborative behaviour, dividing it up into market shares which remained
quite stable as time went by. Consumers were just beginning to acquire industrial goods
and they were not very demanding.
So, once the firm had achieved a minimum production scale and a given share of
the domestic market, the typical consumer-goods manufacturer would reach a plateau. It
was perfectly possible for the firm to continue operating in this way, with family-style
management: there were no strong pressures pushing the firm to continue evolving. Its
environment became quite stable and safe.
The lack of strong competitive pressures, once the firm had passed a certain
threshold, had repercussions on the way production was organized. Productivity
increases, quality improvements and cost reductions were not compulsory. Hence, while
production was broadly organized following the guidelines used in industrialized
countries, firms were not required to continue introducing the changes that would have
led to improvements in productivity and quality.
The import-substitution development model allowed the countries in the region
to create a manufacturing sector. Without it, most countries would at present have a
substantially smaller number of industrial firms. This model provided for the learning and
evolution that make it possible to turn a workshop into a manufacturing firm. It also
contributed to adapting several generations of rural migrants into industrial production
workers. Furthermore, an important proportion of the manufactured goods the region
exports nowadays comes from firms that exist thanks to import-substitution
industrialization policies. However, by the 1960s, this model had become a constraint
on the development of Latin American countries (ECLAC, 1994).
Between the mid-1970s and the late 1980s, most of the countries in the region
substantially transformed their macroeconomic and trade policies, as well as most of the
regulatory environment. These changes had a considerable impact on firms in the region,
altering the framework they were used to operating in and submitting them to strong
import-competition pressures. The desire to know more about the behaviour of
manufacturing firms today was the driving force behind the research being presented in
this paper.
2.  Main findings
2.1 Influence of macroeconomic and trade policies
What is the influence of macroeconomic and trade policies on firms’ behaviour?
An examination of differences in behaviour between firms in Chile, Mexico and
Venezuela, and of the evolution within a given country as time goes by is useful in
assessing the importance of this influence.
Most Chilean firms had maintained their production levels or increased them in
the year that preceded the interviews. This was due to the general macroeconomic
stability and to sustained growth in Chile. It was also due to the fact that the firms that
had managed to survive the shock of the industrial restructuring that took place at the
end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s were relatively strong, even under the
pressure of increased import competition.
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Mexican firms had a two-tier behaviour. Most of them had had a sharp drop of
up to 30% in their output in response to the slow rate of growth of the Mexican
economy up to 1993 and to increased import penetration. However, several firms that
had invested heavily in upgrading and/or that exported had increased their output.
In contrast, most Venezuelan firms had had a sharp drop in output owing to the
considerable decrease in demand that resulted from the political uncertainty in the latter
part of 1992 and very strong competition from imports.
Macroeconomic changes appear to have become even more relevant for
manufacturing firms after trade liberalization. For example, an appreciation of the
exchange rate results in substantial increase in import-competition, in a very short period
of time.
Further evidence of the impact of macroeconomic trends on firms’ behaviour is
the evolution of exports by Chilean firms. While in 1990, several of the companies
surveyed in this country belonged to a category that could be classified as having
“moderate exports”, regularly exporting between 5% and 10% of their output, by 1992
there were no firms in this category in Chile. Firms had either opted out of the export
market completely or had substantially increased their export efforts and the percentage
of output they exported. The growth of domestic demand combined with an
appreciation of the exchange rate polarized the firms’ export behaviour, pushing most of
them to focus exclusively on the domestic market, while those which wished to
continue exporting had to become increasingly specialized in the export market. This is
illustrated by the fact that while, among Chilean firms interviewed in given sectors, the
number of firms exporting decreased as the exchange rate appreciated, average exports
for those that exported regularly increased from 15.6% of their output in 1990 to 44%
in 1992.
The fact that the evolution of the firms’ output was heavily influenced by
macroeconomic events in the three countries shows the importance of the
macroeconomic environment for company behaviour.
Similarly, there is a clear link between exporting behaviour and the degree of
openness of the economy: none of the Venezuelan firms were exporting at the time of
the interviews (March 1993), while there were several exporting firms in Chile and even
more in Mexico. These two countries had liberalized trade before Venezuela and it was
clear that there would be no policy reversal. Venezuela, on the other hand, had
liberalized trade late in the 1980s but, at the time of the interviews, there were serious
doubts that this policy would be sustained. The events that have taken place in
Venezuela since then have proved that this was a correct assessment of the situation.
The strong influence of macroeconomic and trade policies on firms’ behaviour
means that the implications of these policies must be carefully evaluated. This is
particularly important at times when several countries in the region are undergoing
strong currency appreciation. Similarly, the effects on firms’ behaviour of uncertainty in
respect to policy must also be taken into account. An example of this is what took place
in Venezuela from 1993 on. Another example is what has been happening in Mexico
since December 1994, although further research needs to be carried out to evaluate the
implications of these recent events for manufacturing firms’ behaviour.
2.2 Margin for microeconomic behaviour
However, in spite of the important influence of the economic environment on
firms, the research also leads to the conclusion that there is a margin for company
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strategy: not all the Chilean firms were modernizers, not all the Venezuelan firms were
going under.
Some firms can manage to be competitive in spite of an adverse environment
and of being in a subsector where there is very strong import competition. One example
of this are two Venezuelan firms that were willing to continue investing, training their
personnel and to search for new survival strategies while most firms in that country
were seeing their output drop and their market share dwindle owing to the recession and
to import competition. These modernizing firms had gambled that they would survive
and were following an active upgrading strategy in order to be competitive.
Another example can be seen in several Mexican industries characterized by
particularly strong import penetration, such as the garment and shoe industries. While
many firms in these industries had closed down, several surviving firms were doing
remarkably well, thanks to their efforts to adapt to the new environment.
More research should be carried out on individual firm strategies and the
capability that some firms have to learn and adapt to a new environment. There is much
to be learnt from these firms and  knowing more about their strategy would be useful
for policy design. Efforts should also be made to provide economic theory with a more
solid theoretical framework for analysing the scope for microeconomic behaviour (Nelson
1991).
2.3 Changes in firms’ behaviour
The general behaviour of a manufacturing firm under import-substitution, as
described above, is still an accurate description of the behaviour of some firms today.
However, the research led to the conclusion that the behaviour of many firms in the
region is undergoing substantial change.
The interviews with firm executives and private-sector representatives carried
out during the investigation showed that the entrepreneurial environment is very
dynamic and that changes are taking place. It is possible that many more
transformations are occurring than can be perceived at an aggregate level, partly
because some are still incipient and also because many of the changes are in conflicting
directions.
In order to survive, manufacturing firms have been forced to adapt to their new
environment. This has required substantial investments, which can be very costly given
the limited availability of long-term financing, as well as the high interest rates that have
prevailed in the region, particularly under stabilization policies.
From the information gathered during this investigation, what are the changes in
consumer-goods manufacturing firms in Chile, Mexico and Venezuela, today? The
present section addresses this issue, first by describing the behaviour of most
modernizing firms and then by concentrating on some specific areas where there have
been major changes.
Modernizing firms are specializing, decreasing the number of production lines,
while increasing the variety of goods manufactured within the production lines they
maintain. They are decreasing the size of lots and the time that it takes to produce
them. They are also decreasing inventories, particularly those of final goods.
To achieve this, companies are changing their lay-out, following the advice of
external consultants that they hire themselves or that are contacted through foreign
firms, such as clients or companies they have a licence from. The changes in lay-out are
no longer conceived as something that will remain in place for a long time, but rather are
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implemented with flexibility and the willingness to adapt it regularly as changes in
demand require.
The changes in lay-out are carried out with the purpose of easing the production
flow and improving quality control. The introduction of automated control of the
production flow also enables the firm to have precise information on individual worker
productivity and to detect bottlenecks quickly.
The plants that are modernizing most successfully are those that have been able
systematically to apply production standards and efficiency goals following Fordist
practices. This has enabled them to increase productivity substantially. Production
routines have also been modified to introduce more quality check-points and, in the
most advanced plants, to increase individual worker responsibility for quality standards.
In respect to whether flexible specialization and greater worker autonomy are replacing
Fordist practices, the research confirms the findings of a previous case study in the
Brazilian shoe industry that "suggests that more important than the boundaries are the
connections between Fordism and flexible specialization" (Schmitz, 1995).
Quality has also improved thanks to substantial upgrading of design capability as
professional personnel are hired and automated equipment is put in place.
The desire to improve quality and to attain efficiency goals have led firms to
modify pay systems. The changes implemented for this purpose, described below,
indicate that firms are seeking pay systems that fit their need to upgrade productivity
and quality standards.
The changes in the organization of production and in pay systems are
accompanied by changes in management practices, as firms pass from a family-based
management style to one following professional guidelines. These changes are in
response to an increasingly competitive environment, but often coincide with a
generational transition within ownership.
The following are the areas in which the most important changes are taking
place.
(a) Vertical integration
An illustration of the changes in the macroeconomic and trade policies resulting
in changes at the microeconomic level is the degree of vertical integration within firms.
High degrees of vertical integration were advantageous under import-substitution
policies because firms selling intermediate goods had considerable market power,
particularly when they sold to firms that were rivals in the finished-product market.
However, this is no longer the case given the increased options for input procurement
outside the country resulting from trade liberalization.
In effect, the interviews in vertically-integrated plants, provided evidence that
often nowadays a high degree of vertical integration has gone from being an asset to
being a liability for firms, as it restricts their flexibility for input procurement. On several
occasions, managers in charge of producing final goods complained about having to use
inputs made within the same firm, an obligation that restricted their possibilities of
purchasing a variety of inputs at low cost, in a reasonable period of time. In most cases,
it was not only cheaper for them to buy inputs outside the firm, but the delays involved
were also reduced. Every one of the vertically-integrated firms said that they were using
increasingly lower proportions of inputs produced within the same firm.
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Plants manufacturing non-competitive intermediate goods have been particularly
severely affected, since not only has there been a decrease in the inputs they
manufacture for plants within the same firm, but the demand for their goods from other
firms within the country has plummeted. Quite often, unless they provide a very
competitive input, vertically-integrated plants are an obstacle to the flexibility with
which firms now need to operate in order to be able to respond quickly to changes in
demand.
Some companies have begun to address this issue by setting up different firms
within a conglomerate and decreasing the obligations of firms to buy inputs from related
plants. In several cases, the move towards vertical disintegration has gone even further
as firms that were formerly integrated have separated into different firms, with separate
ownership. This allows firms to specialize in separate segments of the production
sequence, gaining economies of scale.
(b) Utilization of imported outputs
Along with the decrease in vertical integration there has been a significant
change in input procurement, as firms in the three countries use increasing amounts of
imported inputs. This was something that could have been expected after trade
liberalization processes combined with currency appreciation. There was evidence of it
in the three countries, as all firms had increased their use of imported inputs in the
previous three years.
Chilean firms used higher percentages of imported inputs than their Mexican and
Venezuelan counterparts. This is due to the fact that trade liberalization started earlier in
Chile than in the other two countries. It also results from the small size of the economy,
which limits the variety of inputs manufactured domestically.
For firms that were not vertically integrated, trade liberalization was an
opportunity to buy a greater variety of inputs, often of better quality and at lower cost.
The use of imported inputs has played an important role in firms’ strategy to become
more competitive.
(c) Technology
A rough estimation of the technological level of the firms was made by
comparing equipment during the interviews with firm executives and visits to the plants.
The first finding is that when the technological level of firms in the same
industry is compared across countries, the differences, surprisingly, are much smaller
than would have been expected given the differences in the sizes of the economies.
While it is true that some of the firms with the most advanced technologies were
Mexican, the average gap between similar industries in the three countries does not
seem to be very wide.
In contrast, there is a wide range of technological levels between firms in the
same industry within a same country. This was the case for Chile, Mexico and
Venezuela. This range is evidence of the heterogeneity of Latin American industry. At
least in traditional consumer-goods manufacturing sectors, different technological levels
seem to be able to exist side by side. This dispersion appeared to be greater in Mexico
than in the other two countries.
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It was also surprising to find that, for large and medium-sized companies, there
is no systematic correlation between the size of the firm and its technological level.
Several of the largest firms interviewed had quite low technological levels, while some
medium-sized firms had better equipment, as well as more modern management
practices. This may be due to the fact that some large firms that are older and
accustomed to operating in an import-substitution environment are addressing other
issues, such as increasing flexibility and subcontracting, before introducing technological
innovations.
Similarly, there also appears to be a lack of systematic correlation between
investment in hard technology and firm competitiveness. Several firms had relatively
sophisticated equipment, without being very competitive. For example, some firms,
particularly in Venezuela, had relatively advanced equipment that they often did not use.
However, while a relatively high technological level does not imply that the firm
is competitive, the reverse does seem to be true. More than the technological level they
had attained, what seemed to characterize modernizing firms was the search for ways
of increasing their technological level by acquiring the specific equipment that would
allow them to solve particular problems.
In other words, more than expenditure on capital goods for the whole plant,
what characterized modernizing firms was their efforts to, in a way, fine tune the
incorporation of technology in the plant, and to do so systematically, on a permanent
basis.
(d) Incentive pay systems and management techniques
In most firms in the region production workers are still paid on the basis of fixed
wages that are a function of the time spent at the workplace and are often linked to the
evolution of the minimum wage. Some firms also have piecework.
However, the goal of improving productivity and quality has led many firms to
explore new pay systems. A growing number of firms interviewed in the course of the
research are trying out new ways to pay production workers that would result in
productivity increases. For example, most of the highly exporting firms were using new
schemes to pay their production workers, schemes that are innovative, at least in
respect to current practices in the region. Such schemes include incentives for
attendance and achieving quality, as well as productivity goals based on international
industrial standards.
Efforts in this direction were most frequent in Mexico. Half of the firms
interviewed in that country had innovative pay schemes in which attendance and quality
incentives could amount  to up to half the workers’ monthly wage.  The purpose was
clearly to find the pay system that would best enable the firms to improve their
productivity, as well as the quality of their products. There are even a few firms in
Mexico that are paying an extra bonus in function of the worker’s capability and
willingness to work in different positions within the plant. Similarly, follow-up visits to
Venezuelan firms at the beginning of 1995 showed that the most modernizing firms in
that country were also training workers to carry out multipurpose tasks.
The companies that were introducing new ways to pay their workers were also
among the most dynamic, as well as the most innovative in other areas, such as in the
introduction of new management techniques. In fact, this last characteristic is almost a
prerequisite for incentive pay, since setting up more sophisticated pay systems than
those most frequently used in Latin America requires procedures that allow careful
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monitoring of the productivity and quality of the work of individual workers.6 The
managers of these modernizing firms say that one of their most important competitive
advantages is precisely their human-resources practice. While it is not yet apparent
which are the most efficient systems, companies are clearly aware that improving
productivity and quality requires innovations in incentive pay systems.
(e) Training
Most of the firms in Chile and Venezuela provided very little training for their
workers. This was particularly surprising in the case of the former country since Chilean
firms can obtain a tax credit to cover the cost of some training activities and
entrepreneurs in that country stated that deficiencies in human capital were among the
greatest competitive disadvantages they faced (Macario, 1995).
Mexican firms, on the other hand, appeared to be much more willing to spend
resources on training their personnel, although, on average, the amount spent is quite
small. Some of the companies interviewed even had small schools in the plant, where
not only training but also general education programmes were provided.
Mexican companies’ greater disposition to train their workers is due partly to a
combination of the lower average educational level of the workforce and the various
training programmes being offered by the governments (Federal and regional).
However, the main explanation for Mexican firms’ greater training efforts is their
wish to achieve a substantial increase in productivity to counter the competitive
pressures to which they are being submitted. The firms that are investing more
resources and energy in training are precisely those that are trying to overhaul their
entire organization.
(f) Subcontracting
When import-substitution policies were predominant, there were firms in the
region that subcontracted part of their production, but this tended to be the exception
rather than a frequent practice. Most large firms were not under great pressure to
decrease costs and they had a relatively stable market share. If new operations had to
be carried out on a regular basis, they ended up being undertaken internally in the firm.
Subcontracting was generally carried out for very specialized tasks or for unexpected
surges in demand.
The situation now appears to have altered radically. One of the most relevant
changes observed during the interviews was the remarkable increase in subcontracting
by firms in the region. This increase results from changes that are occurring both at the
global level and within the region.
In the first place, there has been a considerable surge of international
subcontracting as firms establish dynamic networks on a worldwide basis, thanks to the
decrease in transportation costs and improvements in telecommunications (Dicken,
1992).
Meanwhile, in Latin America, trade liberalization processes combined with an
appreciation of the exchange rate have exposed firms to very strong competitive
                                           
6 One of the innovations most frequently observed was the introduction of computerized
systems that allow the control that permit the monitoring of production flow and of inventories.
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pressures. Many companies have been forced to downsize and decrease costs.
Subcontracting plays a key role in firms’ survival strategies, allowing them to decrease
fixed costs and to respond more quickly to changes in demand.
Most of the firms interviewed had increased the manufacturing operations they
subcontracted in recent years. Moreover, most of them expected subcontracting to
increase substantially during the years to come. Some of them subcontracted the
manufacturing of products they had previously produced internally in the firm, but for
which production lines had been closed down. In other cases, firms had decided to
centralize product design and subcontract most of the manufacturing process.
While an increase in subcontracting could have been reasonably foreseen at the
beginning of the investigation, the extent to which it is practiced in Chile, Mexico and
Venezuela is quite surprising. Not only has subcontracting within the country itself
become prevalent, but many firms were subcontracting abroad. In some cases, the
principal firm subcontracted to a firm in a neighbouring country that had a cheaper and
better trained workforce, as was the case for the Venezuelan firms that subcontracted
operations in Colombia. In other cases, the companies had decided to gain a competitive
edge by going to the region that produces the goods that are taking market share from
them, that is, they subcontracted directly in Asia.
This practice, which is being carried out in a large variety of sectors, is
particularly widespread in garment and footwear manufacturing. Rather that letting
themselves be displaced from Latin American markets by Asian products, firms have
decided to subcontract at least some production lines directly in Asia.
While some firms have gone all the way, practically shutting down domestic
production and concentrating instead on distribution, most firms have reacted in a way
that will allow them much more flexibility in the long run: they subcontract production in
those lines in which they are less competitive, while trying to become very competitive
in the production-lines they retain. In this way, if there are changes, such as a
depreciation of the exchange rate, they will still have manufacturing capabilities and can
then increase domestic production. Meanwhile, this strategy allows them to defend their
market share in the domestic market, particularly given exchange-rate appreciation and
the remarkable surge of Asian exports, at low costs and of ever-increasing quality.
This practice is much more widespread than is publicly perceived. Entrepreneurs
are reluctant to mention it, more so in Mexico and Venezuela than in Chile. This is
because they fear a negative reaction; another reason is that many trade associations
are demanding government protection against what they perceive to be unfair
competition from Asian products. The entrepreneurs are also reluctant to reveal what is
one of the key elements of their competitive strategy. But the fact is that the most
competitive firms in the region are following this strategy and it is a very sensible one,
allowing the company to survive and concentrate on manufacturing the products in
which it is competitive.
(g) Distribution and retailing
For most manufacturing industries, distribution and retailing did not play a key
role when import-substitution policies aimed at creating a domestic industrial sector
were prevalent. Productive activities were favoured over distribution and it was much
easier to obtain subsidized credit to set up an industrial plant than for outlets.
Furthermore, industrial manufacturers had substantial market power over retailers, who
did not have much choice in purchasing their merchandise. Hence, production was
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emphasized rather than retailing; even if manufacturers often distributed their own
goods directly to consumers, the core of the manufacturing business was the plant.
Circumstances have changed dramatically for most of the traditional
consumer-goods manufacturing industries. By opening up their economies, Latin
American countries have enabled their consumers to choose among a wide variety of
goods. Import penetration is very strong. Retailers are no longer restricted to goods
produced domestically. This has produced a shift in manufacturers’ activities.
This shift became obvious in the course of the investigation in Chile, Mexico and
Venezuela. Most of the executives of modernizing firms said that their main concern
was to become competitive in distribution and to achieve name recognition for their
brand. They said that this was the single most important factor for the survival of their
manufacturing activities, as the market was flooded with goods from other countries.
Because of this goal, at the same time as the decrease in the degree of
backward vertical integration, there has been a substantial increase in investment to
increase forward integration: for many manufacturing companies, ensuring the presence
of their brand in the domestic market and a strong retail structure allows them to ensure
that they will survive as a firm.
While this situation was noted in all three countries it was most evident in Chile.
Almost all of the company executives interviewed in that country said that ensuring a
good retailing system was of the uppermost importance to them. Sometimes the
company itself owned the retail stores, sometimes it did not; but in any case, retailing is
a crucial aspect of firm strategy.
The fact that while this situation was also observed in Mexico and Venezuela, it
was not as prevalent there as in Chile, due to the relatively small size of the Chilean
domestic market, so that capturing market share is more important. It also results from
the fact that foreign trade before Mexico and Venezuela, and that many firms in Chile
were forerunners in recognizing the importance of retailing for manufacturing firm
strategy.
Whatever is the main reason, the fact is that while the trend was much more
significant in Chile, the importance of establishing solid distribution networks was also a
key element of the strategies of the most competitive firms interviewed in Mexico and
Venezuela. One Venezuelan firm executive who runs a very interesting, innovative firm
stated the following: "If I had any investment resources available, I would open new
stores". Similarly, the chief executive officer of the Mexican firm that was among the
best organized manufacturing plants visited believes that his greatest competitive
disadvantage is his lack of forward integration.
Another indication of the importance of this trend is the fact that many
companies that were investing were actually concentrating most of the resources on
improving the distribution of the firm’s products, rather than in manufacturing itself. In
fact, technological innovations, such as on-line sales and inventories, were often
introduced with the same purpose. Similarly, firms frequently tend to focus training
efforts on marketing employees, rather than on production workers.
A strong distribution network also allows manufacturers to distribute imported
goods, thus defending the market share of their own brand as this provides them with
the opportunity to have some control over the prices at which competing imports are
sold, as well as of making profits on their sales. This strategy appears to be very sound
from the manufacturer’s point of view, as it allows firms to benefit from import surges
and to continue manufacturing the production lines in which they are still competitive,
while simultaneously retaining their market share.
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(h) Exporting firms
What were the differences between modernizing firms in general and those that
regularly exported a significant proportion of their output (over 15% or 20%)?
In respect to sales and employment, the exporting firms included in the
investigation were quite similar to those that exported only occasionally, those that
regularly exported a small percentage of their output and those that did not export at all.
While exporting firms tended to have slightly higher employment and sales levels than
non-exporting firms, the differences were not significant between the two groups, for a
given industry.
There does appear to be a minimum sales threshold beneath which it is difficult
to find firms that export regularly. This is probably due to the fixed costs involved in
exporting, such as purchasing equipment that enables the firm to achieve better quality,
and in acquiring clients abroad, as well as the paperwork required to export. However,
above a certain level, there no longer seems to be a systematic correlation between firm
size and export activity: while in a given industry most exporting is effectively carried
out by large firms, there are medium-sized firms that export and many large firms that
do not export at all. The growing number of  Latin American medium-sized firms that are
exporting is an interesting phenomenon that deserves further study.
However, the one significant difference between exporting and non-exporting
firms was the greater concern that the former have for quality improvement. Exporting
firms are increasingly exporting goods manufactured according to export-market
specifications, instead of simply exporting goods that are identical to the products they
sell on the domestic market. The importance of quality for exporting firms has
implications for lay-out specifications, as well as for training and incentive pay systems.
Exporting firms provided training more frequently than non-exporters and tended to have
introduced more innovations in pay systems.
Exporting selling in the domestic market should not necessarily be viewed as
involving a trade-off. In fact they can often be interrelated choices, particularly in small
economies such as the Chilean one. It may be that a firm needs to export in order to
attain the scale that allows it to be competitive in the domestic market. Exporting also
provides learning opportunities for firms, as they learn how to satisfy requirements in
more demanding markets. This learning has a positive spill over in the domestic market.
Simultaneously, a solid standing in the domestic market allows the firm to bear the cost
of going into new export activities.
The investigation leads to the conclusion that in traditional consumer-goods
industries, there are no significant differences between large and medium-sized
modernizing firms that focus mainly on the domestic market and exporting firms. The
only exceptions are the importance of quality for exporting firms and the learning
opportunities provided by exporting. It may be said that in general exporters are
modernizers, but that not all modernizers export.
2.4 Flexibility
The previous sections have described how the most innovative consumer-goods
manufacturing firms in Chile, Mexico and Venezuela are undergoing important changes
in the way production is organized, in vertical integration and input procurement, as well
as in management style and in pay systems, among other features. Companies are
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adapting and learning how to be competitive in the new economic environment
prevailing in the Latin American countries.
However, more than a massive overhaul of the firm that is carried out once and
for all, the most relevant characteristic of these innovating companies is the flexibility
they have continuously to improve their performance, for example thanks to the ability
to pinpoint the areas where bottlenecks are most severe. Transformations are now
carried out on a permanent basis sometimes by small changes at a time. These
transformations end up leading in the long run to a massive overhaul of production
practices, but of a different nature than can be achieved in a once-and-for-all effort.
The importance of such flexibility should not be underestimated: firms that have
the highest success rate (and the highest survival rate in the face of very adverse
shocks, such as companies in Venezuela) are those that are able to react quite rapidly
and adapt to new circumstances. This flexibility plays a role both in production and in
distribution.
For example, one of the areas where there is evidence that flexibility is
important is in enabling firms to have more adaptable production systems that allow
them to react to changes in consumer demand and to produce a wide variety of goods
within a reduced number of production lines. Changes in production are increasingly
demand-led. The time it takes for firms to introduce changes in response to changes in
demand has decreased.
Another area in which this flexibility is critical is the ability firms have to react to
changes in the exchange rate, retaining a minimum production capability that enables
them to cover their market share, while being willing rapidly to become themselves
distributors of some lines of imported goods when there is a substantial appreciation of
the exchange rate.
The strategy of becoming the main importers of goods competing with their own
products and distributing them through their own distribution channels was one of the
strategies hesitantly adopted by a few firms in Chile in the late 1970s and early 1980s
in retrospect, this strategy was to become very successful.
Entrepreneurs have learnt from this past experience, and the most successful
and resilient firms in the three countries are those that have the flexibility to rapidly
become importers and distributors of competing imported goods. They have realized that
it is the best way to be able to manage prices and to set prices of imported versus
domestically produced goods according to their production capabilities. This strategy
allows the firm, while continuing the production of its most competitive goods, to use
its own distribution channels. Behind this strategy is the idea that if the firm does not do
this, another firm will seize the opportunity and displace it.
However, while becoming distributors of imported goods is a strategy that is
increasingly being put in practice by enterprising Mexican and Venezuelan
manufacturers, and continues to be practiced by the Chilean ones, it is not always
readily acknowledged by them, since they are reluctant to admit that they are becoming
strong importers of competing goods.
Summary table: Manufacturing firm strategies in the 1990s




Flexibility in the continuous introduction of changes in
production and distribution in response to changes in
demand and in the macroeconomic environment (such as
the exchange rate);




Production changes are demand-led;
Large increases in subcontracting based on long-term
relationships;
Strong interaction between production and distribution;
Whenever possible, closer ties with retailers or significant
increases in retailing carried out by the firm itself;
Rigid passive behaviour;
Exclusive reliance on in-house expertise;
Productivity data is unavailable;
Traditional pay systems;
Family-based management;
Limited changes in response to production
concerns;
Subcontracting is non-existent or quite limited;
Firm focuses exclusively on production;




Substantial decrease in vertical integration: related plants
become independent firms;
Significant increase in the utilization of imported inputs;
Efforts to improve design capability;
Decreases in inventories;
Regular changes in lay-out;
Reduction in the number of production lines;
Increased product diversity within production lines;
Quality is important;
Individual worker responsibility for quality;
Technological innovations are introduced at key points,
after thorough assessment of existing bottlenecks;
Technological innovations are introduced regularly on a
continuous basis;
The firm provides training for its workers.
Decrease in vertical integration;




Number of production lines maintained;
Limited product diversity within production lines;
Quality is not a priority;
Quality control at a few points of the assembly
line;
If introduced, technological innovations are
bought in a package, not in response to a careful
assessment of the plant’s strengths and
weaknesses;
Technological innovations are introduced on a
once-and-for-all basis;
The firm does not train its workers.
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2.5 The shift in the core of the manufacturing business
In addition to the importance of flexibility for firms’ strategy, another relevant
feature of the changes that are occurring in firms’ behaviour is the shift in what
constitutes the core of the strategy.
Under import-substitution, manufacturing firms had a relatively advantageous
position in respect to distributors and retailing firms: they could obtain credit at
preferential rates and special permits to import inputs, and could lobby to stop imports
of competing goods once they had set up local production facilities, among many other
advantages. Even if some manufacturing firms were also retailers, the core of the
manufacturing business was production.
Today, the situation for Latin American manufacturing firms is radically different.
They face vigorous competition in the domestic market, both from imports and from
other domestic firms that are trying to defend their market share. Consumers have also
grown more demanding as they have had access to a wider variety of goods, not only
as a result of trade liberalization, but also of the appreciation in the exchange rate.
A competitive manufacturing firm today not only has to upgrade the organization
of production, but must have an active and aggressive retailing strategy. Trade
liberalization, particularly in a context of currency appreciation, has significantly
increased the importance of distribution and retailing. The most innovative
manufacturing firms studied in the survey were those that had a network of retailing
outlets, with the goal of preserving market share in the domestic market and benefiting
from selling imported goods. Retailing also allows manufacturing firms to increase their
profit margins since it is in essence a non-tradable activity, in which profit margins have
soared in recent years. It also allows firms to manage flexibly a product mix of goods
manufactured in their own plants and imported goods, depending on the evolution of the
exchange rate.
The follow-up interviews carried out in Venezuelan firms in 1995 showed that
the most competitive firms were putting into practice a strategy of decreasing the
amount of goods they sold to intermediaries and increasing the proportion of goods they
retailed themselves. Executives of these firms said that the key survival strategy for
their firms was to improve the distribution network and retail most of the products
themselves.
The transformations in the way the Latin American economies integrate into
world markets have had significant consequences for manufacturing firms’ behaviour.
Manufacturing firms need to upgrade their supply capabilities by responding to changes
in demand. This upgrading is crucial for their survival. However, in order to be able to do
that, manufacturing firms first have to be able to defend their presence in the market.
What has changed with trade liberalization, globalization and the transformations in the
firms’ economic environment is precisely the core of the manufacturing business: to
survive and become competitive, manufacturing firms must improve their marketing
capabilities and, in order to do so, they must transform their supply capabilities.
2.6 Uncertainty
Macroeconomic stability and certainty that economic policy would be sustained
were among the most important positive characteristics of the economic environment
mentioned by Chilean and Mexican entrepreneurs during the interviews. These were
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carried out in 1993, before the Mexican crisis that began with the devaluation of
December 1994.
In contrast, one of the main obstacles to investing in upgrading and in
export-oriented projects for  Venezuelan firms interviewed in 1993 was uncertainty
surrounding economic policies. This was confirmed by the follow-up interviews in
Venezuelan firms in 1995, which showed that firms that had pursued active upgrading
policies were either in an extremely vulnerable position or bankrupt, while those that had
adopted a passive attitude had benefited from their decision not to upgrade.
The specific cases of the two largest garment manufacturers interviewed in
Venezuela, hereafter called firm A and firm B, illustrate this. When the first interviews
took place (March 1993), these two firms had decided to adopt two distinctly different
strategies: firm A had decided that it would continue operating largely the same way it
had operated under import-substitution and that it would not invest in upgrading
production capability, nor in improving the quality of the goods it manufactured. This
conservative strategy was also adopted for exports, in which the firm decided it would
not invest any resources.
Firm B, on the other hand, had decided to invest a substantial amount of
resources in a complete upgrading of the firm’s production capability, both in terms of
quality of the goods produced and the volume of production. To achieve this, it hired
international consultants who redesigned the plant and trained the employees.
Simultaneously, technological innovations were introduced as new equipment was
purchased and production procedures were transformed. The company’s goal was to
cope with the strong import competition in the domestic market and then continue to
expand its markets by exporting.
At the time of the initial interviews, it seemed that firm A would slowly die
owing to increased import competition and to its inability (or the lack of interest of its
owners) to react to the change from an import-substitution model to that of an open
economy, whereas, the strategy of firm B would allow it to become competitive in the
new prevailing environment, to survive import competition in the domestic market and
to export regularly.
When the follow-up interviews were carried out two years later, in 1995,
circumstances were strikingly different. The new Government of Venezuela had decided
to reverse several of the policy reforms carried out at the end of the 1980s and the
beginning of the 1990s. While the trade liberalization policy was not formally reversed,
it was so in practice by exchange controls that made it quite difficult for firms to have
access to hard currency for imports, including inputs. Import competition had thus been
slashed. Furthermore, the pegging of the exchange rate at a time of high inflation made
it extremely difficult for manufacturing firms to export.
Given these circumstances, firm A had been relatively successful thanks to its
decision not to invest in upgrading the plant. This strategy had allowed the firm to have
a solid financial position without incurring debts. It had proved successful because
changes in economic policy, such as the introduction of exchange control, had resulted
in a substantial decrease in import competition, while there was a simultaneous increase
in interest rates. Hence, firms that had adopted a passive attitude and had decided not
to change their strategy and not to upgrade benefited from the decreased import
competition in the domestic market and from a sound financial position.
Meanwhile, firms that had invested in upgrading production capability were hurt
by the increase in interest rates. For example, firm B was in severe financial difficulties,
having incurred debts to finance the upgrading. Although it was still able to export,
exports had been curtailed by the obstacles to importing good quality competitive
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inputs, such as exchange control, as well as by the appreciation of the exchange rate.
Complex and discretionary administrative procedures also made importing and exporting
very difficult. So, firms that had invested in upgrading and had tried to become
competitive were in the end losers compared to those that had adopted a passive
attitude.
It is clear that in the long run this situation will not last. Venezuela cannot
support an artificial exchange rate forever. Neither will it always be able to sustain
policies that tend to limit import competition. Venezuelan firms will eventually find
themselves in a competitive environment once again. Under those circumstances, firm A
will clearly be forced to change or it will lose a substantial amount of market share,
while firm B will reap benefits from its investments.
In the meantime, firm B will undoubtedly gain market share even if the economy
does not open up, thanks to its upgrading efforts. When interviewed in 1995, this
company was also gaining market share because so many domestic firms were failing.
The question is whether firms that invested in upgrading will still be operating in the
long run or whether they will go under because of the financial burden of upgrading and
the reversal of economic policy.
Furthermore, the firms that had believed the Government’s claims that trade
liberalization would be sustained and that they should invest in export-oriented projects
were those that were the most damaged by the policy reversal. The appreciation of the
exchange rate that resulted from the exchange control and the pegging of the currency
in an inflationary process made their exports less competitive on foreign markets. The
obstacles to importing inputs presented by the exchange control and customs red tape
were an additional difficulty for those firms that had increased the use of imported
inputs as one of their upgrading strategies.
The interviews carried out throughout the investigation showed that uncertainty
surrounding economic policy leads to a substantial decrease in investment by firms.
There is no incentive for firms to invest in long-term projects when policy reversals and
macroeconomic instability render the rate of return unpredictable.
The comparison of firms’ behaviour in the three countries included in the
research shows that uncertainty explains why more firms do not change and why those
that do often do not change faster. Uncertainty has a twofold negatively affects
entrepreneurs’ decisions to transform their firms: there is uncertainty about what they
should do and uncertainty in respect to the sustainability of the economic policy.
In the first place, entrepreneurs are often aware that they must alter the way
their firms operate, but are not certain what changes should be carried out or how. This
implies that there is a role to be played in providing them with technical support on best
practices through public/private sector networks.
However, the uncertainty that probably has the most negative impact on firms’
decisions concerning upgrading is whether trade liberalization will be sustained or not. If
this policy is not completely credible, many firms will be reluctant to change their
behaviour. This lag can result in many more firms going under than would reasonably
have been be expected. The strong deindustrialization process that took place in Chile in
the late 1970s is an example of this.
The conclusion that can be drawn from this is that it is of the utmost importance
that major policy changes are credible in order for firms to change their behaviour and
try to become more competitive. But it is also possible to conclude that, if there is
uncertainty, it makes sense that more firms do not change or that they do not change
faster. Upgrading requires that the firm is disposed to change its behaviour and to invest
heavily, as well as certainty that the new policies are there to stay.
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3. Conclusions
Manufacturing firms in Latin America are undergoing substantial transformations in order
to be competitive in the new conditions that are characterized by trade liberalization,
globalization and, in general, by transformations in the economic environment. Many
firms still have a passive or reactive attitude with behaviour quite similar to that
described in section 1. However, the overwhelming majority of entrepreneurs in the
region are aware that they must change the way they operate and have already begun
to do so: the behaviour of most firms is completely different now than it was 10 or 15
years ago.
These changes in firms’ behaviour are strongly influenced by the transformations
in macroeconomic and trade policies, as well as in the general economic environment.
Evidence of that can be seen in the differences in firms’ behaviour across countries.
However, there were firms in the three countries that were changing their
behaviour irrespective of the economic environment, adopting particularly innovative and
aggressive strategies. While Venezuelan firms on average tended to be more passive and
reluctant to change than their Chilean and Mexican counterparts, the most competitive
Venezuelan firms had strategies that were surprisingly similar to those of the most
aggressive firms in Chile and Mexico. Much is to be learnt from the behaviour of these
firms, particularly for policy recommendations.
In general, there were no differences between exporting firms and modernizing
firms that sell mostly on the domestic market. The exceptions seemed to be that
exporting firms had a much greater concern for quality upgrading and had greater
learning opportunities than non-exporting ones. However, the investigation showed that
modernizing the firm was a condition for sustained export activity.
The transformation that has taken place in the core of the manufacturing
business was one of the most significant results of the research. At least for the most
innovative consumer-goods manufacturing firms, this core has shifted from
concentrating mainly on production matters to a point that combines manufacturing of
goods with distributing these goods, and often other domestic and imported goods as
well. This is the point of the production/distribution segment where manufacturing firms
have greater chances of simultaneously increasing their profits and defending their
market share. Whatever strategy allows firms to be successful at this crucial point plays
a key role in determining the competitive of Latin American manufacturing firms in the
years to come.
The changes that are taking place in the countries of the region have had
significant consequences for Latin American manufacturing companies and have brought
about substantial changes in their behaviour. Finding out more about these changes is a
prerequisite for understanding trends, as well as for making policy recommendations
aimed at improving the competitiveness of firms in the region.
Innovative firms have adopted flexible behaviour and are upgrading their
production and marketing capabilities. They have introduced significant changes in
vertical integration, input procurement, technological innovations, incentive-pay
systems, management techniques, training and subcontracting, as well as in distribution
and retailing.
However, even modernizing entrepreneurs frequently felt that they needed to
make more effort to upgrade their firms. The cost of doing so and, more importantly,
the difficulties in obtaining appropriate information as to what was the best practice in a
given industry were constraints to the introduction of large-scale transformations in a
short period of time.
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Of course, these constraints were even greater for non-modernizing firms, which
knew they had to change the way they operated, but were uncertain about what needed
to be done and how. While some firms in the region will remain passive and will
continue operating as they did under import-substitution as long as they can, there are
many firms which would like to upgrade, but lack the appropriate information to do so.
This suggests that there is a role for government support for programmes
providing firms with information on best practices, particularly in matters relating to
changes in lay-out, quality improvement, incentive pay systems, training and so forth. A
key activity that yields many positive externalities is providing firms with information on
export markets.
An effective way of supplementing inadequate information is through setting up
industry-specific technological centres to promote the upgrading of firms’ supply
capability. These centres should cover the areas in which innovation is crucial, such as
those described above. Governments should sponsor such centres, but they should be
created jointly with the private sector, particularly with entrepreneurial associations.
These centres could also foster associations in which firms could organize to obtain
better conditions of input procurement, technical assistance and distribution, than they
would individually.  A good example of such a centre is the one established in Colombia
by the Asociación Colombiana de Industrias Plásticas (ACOPLÁSTICOS), or the Centro
de Productividad Industrial (CEPRI), recently set up in Chile by the private sector with
government support.
Finally, there are several important criteria that must be taken into account when
considering policies:
(a) The most important role for policy is that of creating a stable economic
environment in which firms can plan long-term investments. As was mentioned earlier,
uncertainty promotes non-productive behaviour;
(b) Policies should be designed for effective implementation and be submitted to
regular evaluation. If not, they are ineffective and they create distrust in the private
sector with respect to the Government;
c) Policies should explicitly seek to promote the upgrading of firms and not be a
disguise for a return to protectionism;
(d) To be effective, policies should be designed and implemented in close
coordination with the private sector.
The new economic framework prevalent in most Latin American countries today,
as well as the increase of globalization world-wide, provide a challenge and an
opportunity for most manufacturing firms in the region. Many firms have already
completely transformed their behaviour. Others will not change, irrespective of the
policy environment they are in. There is a third group, made up of the vast majority of
manufacturing firms, that is willing to change and has begun to introduce some
changes. This is the group that economic policy should target if the goal is for the region
to have the capacity to grow at reasonably fast rates.
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Chile Ac 6 000 300
Chile Bc 17 000 280
Chile Cc 36 000 1 100
Chile Dc 7 000 415
Chile Ec 12 000 108
Chile Fc 12 000 550
Chile Gc 7 000 180
Chile Hc 18 000 360
Chile Ic 11 000 280
Chile Jc 6 000 180
Chile Kc 14 000 600
Chile Lc 24 000 600
Mexico Am 23 000 1 200
Mexico Bm 30 000 750
Mexico Cm 14 000 150
Mexico Dm 13 000 270
Mexico Em 4 000 65
Mexico Fm 2 000 90
Mexico Gm 8 000 250
Mexico Hm 2 500 160
Mexico Im 1 000 1 000
Mexico Jm 13 300 1 100
Mexico Km 15 000 750
Mexico Lm 13 000 400
Mexico Mm 40 000 1 200
Mexico Nm 7 000 105
Mexico Om 50 000 924
Venezuela Av 6 860 85
Venezuela Bv 1 600 108
Venezuela Cv 14 600 500
Venezuela Dv 1 760 97
Venezuela Ev 3 700 240
Venezuela Fv 10 000 70
Venezuela Gv 1 700 80
Venezuela Hv 6 800 400
Venezuela Iv 6 800 818
Venezuela Jv 7 900 100
Venezuela Kv 2 200 600

Desarrollo Productivo series *
No. Title
16 "Reestructuración y competitividad: bibliografía comentada" (LC/G.1840),
Restructuring and competitiveness, November 1994
17 "Síntesis del planteamiento de la CEPAL sobre la equidad y transformación
productiva" (LC/G.1841), Restructuring and competitiveness, December 1994
18 "Two studies on transnational corporations in the Brazilian manufacturing sector:
the 1980s and early 1990s" (LC/G.1842), Transnational corporations and
foreign investment, December 1994
19 "Tendencias recientes de la inversión extranjera directa en América Latina y el
Caribe: elementos de políticas y resultados" (LC/G.1851), Transnational
corporations and foreign investment, December 1994
20 "Empresas transnacionales manufactureras en cuatro estilos de reestructuración
en América Latina. Los casos de Argentina, Brasil, Chile y México después de la
sustitución de importaciones" (LC/G.1857), Transnational corporations and
foreign investment, May 1995
21 "Mexico's incorporation into the new industrial order: foreign investment as a
source of international competitiveness" (LC/G.1864), Transnational
corporations and foreign investment, May 1995
22 "Informe sobre la competitividad internacional de las zonas francas en la
República Dominicana" (LC/G.1866), Transnational corporations and foreign
investment, August 1995
                                           
*       Desarrollo productivo is the continuation, under a new name, of the Industrialización y
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